One key under-developed theme in CE which we have seen come up time and time again in our classroom discussions is the problem of atomic units of experience. CE seems to endorse, if not downright require, some conception of atomic (ultimate and indivisible) experiential units which then get interpreted and reworked by the mind in various ways (think of Locke on discrimination or comparison, or of Hume on asserting conjunction and connexion, or of Berkeley's arch-skeptical resistance to these ideas). Later empiricists would take issue with this core aspect of CE. We see this in various authors including William James and Willard Van Orman Quine, who we are reading for this Thursday. Those interested might also consult Wilfrid Sellars's classic long essay "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind", but be warned that this is a very difficult piece in some parts.
For this week's blog post, consider this criticism of classical empiricism as it arises in either James or Quine. Respond to one of the following two questions and preface your response with the word "James" or "Quine".
- James criticizes CE for having ignored "conjunctive relations" as a direct part of our experiential environment. The CEs, he argues, reduced experience to atomic units but failed to theorize or conceptualize the transitional relations which hold these various atomic bits of experience together. Do you agree with James that "conjunctive relations" are a direct part of our experience? Or would you agree with the CEs (especially Locke) that experience is carved up into discrete bits such that connections between them are what we psychologically, socially, or culturally add to experience as it is? If you agree with James, give an example of a directly-experienced conjunctive relation. If you disagree, give an example of a discrete, atomic, experiential 'bit'.
- Quine criticizes CE for having conceptualized beliefs as the atomic units of experience which directly confront reality. On Quine's understanding of the most sophisticated versions of the CE view (which were quite popular in the early 20th century), we confront the world with our sentence-shaped entities (a belief, a proposition, a statement) and experience itself is able to confirm or disconfirm these sentence-like structure. Quine argues against this reduction of experience atomistic bits of beliefs. He asserts that we do not confront empirical reality bit-by-bit (or sentence-by-sentence) but rather at the level of masses or webs of belief. So one belief on its own ("the cat is on the mat") does not capture our experience nearly as well as a whole mass of beliefs working together ("the cat is on the mat", "a cat is this sort of thing", "a mat is...", "in good seeing conditions, when one sees this sort of thing on that sort of thing, then one is justified in believing...", "there are good seeing conditions in this room right now"). At a first blush, are you inclined to agree with Quine's empiricist holism or do you find it problematic? Offer a brief defense of your view, that is, explain why you agree or disagree with Quine.
Those in the (b)-group should respond. This is the last round of blog posts, by the way, so if you want to make up a missing post, this is the week for you to do it!
Quine
ReplyDeleteAt first blush, I like the look of Quine's holism because it takes context into account. I find this very important because what is content and what is context changes depending on where our attention is focused in each moment. Quine seems to acknowledge the idea that context defines the meaning and significance of what is seen and experienced. Since he acknowledges that when context changes, the entire experience changes, his position seems more flexible and reliable than the CE view.
Quine. I think that Quine's holism seems more realistic and all encompassing then the believes of the ce's. To think that we experience things sentence by sentence individually seems unlikely because we are constantly and instantaneously comparing a complex web of thoughts to the direct sentence we are looking at. It is impossible to make much meaning out of a cat on a mat without taking the context of the cat and the mat into account. It is not only our definition of the words that is pertinent, but also the complex and unspeakable web of interconnectedness that we must utilize in order to have a true idea of the situation. Quine seems to allow for this complex and almost unexplainable process far more than the CEs do
ReplyDeleteQuine.
ReplyDeleteUpon really analyzing our experiences, we must recognize that the experience one would have of "a cat on a mat" would be quite different now (with our awareness of what a cat is, a mat, the environment in which we experience these things, etc.) than it would have been prior to our acquired knowledge of such things. Therefore, because of this varying approach to how one could experience the very same "cat on a mat" one must account for the entire environment or "webs" of beliefs we have already gained from past experience to attribute to the current experience at hand. In this way, I am inclined to agree with Quine, in that our experiences of the world are not confronted "bit by bit."
Quine
ReplyDeleteI find myself agreeing with Quine. I share his trouble with the discretization of experience by classical empiricists. This is what snags Hume's argument, that all ideas must be based on a corresponding and single sense experiences. He raises the problem himself when he exposits an empirical model of epistemology. That is, our ability to ideate a new shade of a color that has never before been seen. It is only because the shade is part of a continuum, Hume argues, that this "singular" exception to the empiricist's rule occurs. But if colors can be broken up into a spectrum of frequencies, it becomes difficult to exclude any phenomenon from being part of a kind of continuum. Each phenomenon being linked and related in such a fashion, it becomes possible to form ideas independent of an experiential genesis.
James
ReplyDeleteI agree with James that CE fails to recognize those "conjunctive relations" which seem to stablize our conception of the world. He specifically calls out the "Berkeleyean schhol" of thought and how it is discontinuous, all of our ideas are seperate atomic universes which can only be brought together by God. This was the biggest problem that I personally had with Berkeley, though James' radical empiricism seems to be more sound. An example of a directly-experienced conjunctive relation could be how I see myself in the mirror each day. I have an experience each day of how I view myself, each a different experience in the strictest sense (I may have gained weight, lost weight, the lights could be on or off, and, most obviously, they are different time slices of my life). I have I direct experience of the sight of myself in the mirror, though it is a conjunctive experience in that I recognize the figure in the mirror as being myself in all those cases. If it had been disjunctive, I would be unable to recognize or name the figure before me being myself because, in the strictest sense, it is not the same relation that I had experienced before.
Quine.
ReplyDeleteI agree with Quine. To say that we experience the everyday bit by bit is impractical. We are constantly either consciously or unconsciously comparing situations that we face everyday with past experience. The things we experience trigger connection to the complex web of other ideas in our heads that comes with experience from past events over time. By just encountering a situation atomically its hard to get the full meaning out of that situation. Using the web of connections that Quine suggests we do, its much easier to get the idea of "the cat on the mat" and grasp the true meaning of a situation. Quines account allows for this though process more then CEs do.
Quine
ReplyDeleteIf you've ever tried meditation then there's a good chance that you've been frustrated by how hard it can be. Whether one tries to completely clear their mind during meditation or instead attempts to focus entirely on one thought, the mind seems to resist (at least, at first) these exercises. I'd have to say that I find Quine's concept of webs of belief to be very appealing due to the fact that, in my own experience, I find it almost impossible to consider only one discrete idea at a time. My mind seems to almost always be considering ideas in relation to other ideas, never just one thought at a time. The few instances in which I have attained true focus are quickly lost as my mind is led, seemingly involuntarily, to other thoughts. The concept, then, of webs of belief as the manner in which the individual confronts experience seems more in keeping with my empirical understanding of life. Although these webs be made of individual strands, e.g. discrete ideas, the strands themselves cannot stand alone.
Quine:
ReplyDeleteI think that Quine’s approach make much more sense, especially so on grounds of practicality. The ‘one sentence’ approach fails, because we perceive the ‘cat on the mat’ with five senses. So we can know that there is a cat on the mat, five different ways. However, this does not directly pertain the cat’s position on the mat, because any one way would be justification enough. Yet, it just goes to show how much empirical evidence there is packed into and behind each singular statement. The regression to which is necessary for this understanding is almost endless.
To speak the singular sentence “the cat is on the mat’ to someone who does not know what a mat is, what a cat is, or does not even comprehend the term ‘being’ that person would not be able to follow or understand the sentence. So if just one of these things were absent, the person would not follow. And that just goes to show how important each aspect of the web of beliefs is to our practical understanding, because without any particular one of them, our testimony or understanding of empirically perceived occurrences would be deficient.
Quine:
ReplyDeleteContent is meaningless without context. By that I mean experiencing something is pointless without having thoughts about that experience. Everything we look at has a subjective meaning created by our minds. (We cannot look at anything completely objectively.) With this in mind, I agree with Quine's web analogy. To form any kind of dialogue about an object or experience requires an understanding of not only the words being used, but the objects being identified. Each of those words and objects are their own idea. There is no way for us to have one thought about something without that also being based off of many other ideas. To understand one thing, even as simple as a cat being on a mat, is also to have ideas about a multitude of things, such as cats and mats in general and their significance.
Brandi Gratis
Quine. I agree in the sense that we must look at the big picture. While we may get away with a narrow perspective, it is always safer to take it all in. Complete understanding is key.
ReplyDeleteI agree with James' opinion that there is a specific shortcoming of Classical Empiricism in that it fails to regard parts of experience as directly connected. It seems to me that experiential atomic bits are indeed connected, and I can legitimately say that I have experienced this relation directly. Saying such a thing gives my experience meaning. Without this direct connection, I can only say that my experiences are various ideas and impressions and any meaning derived from these is a mere interpretation I arrived at due to psychological processes.
ReplyDeleteAn example of directly experiencing connections between different atomic bits of experience can be seen by the smoothie making process. Say that you put berries, milk, and yogurt in a blender. It would make perfect sense to connect the blended result as an effect of the combination of the three ingredients. Sure the experience of having all of the ingredients on their own is separate from the experience of the blended result, but it is reasonable to say the two are directly connected through experience.
Quine
ReplyDeleteI am inclined to agree with Quine. WIthout such a web, one would would be nearly paralyzed. The ability to sythesize, draw inferences and compare different objects and instances without having to be exposed to each spefic before is essential to how we encounter the world.
Quine
ReplyDeleteEven though it is difficult to separate certain ideas from the "web," maybe the point was to take into consideration the foundations of certain objects. We can have an idea of something without having tons of connections to other things. When i think of a cat on the mat sure there are ancellary connections, but i don't necessarily take those into account. Maybe the web of ideas is important, but i think that we can abstract objects to a certain extent. Even though i might not be able to understand cat-ness or mat-ness i understand what the cat and mat are when they are displayed in front me no matter what without any context. I guess it's to say that all experiences are different, but we can still analyze something perfectly without any context. I don't know if any of that made sense.
James
ReplyDeleteOn the one hand, I believe that James has a very good point about the fact that the Classical Empiricists did not provide adequately for the connection or connecting factor between one's experiences. Atomic experiences require a certain basis for continuous connection, or the conjunctive relations between atomic units. On the other hand, our atomic experiential units, by definition, are still in my mind merely that; experiences, which the individual him or herself unites as being his or her own in concepts more complex than the original sensation. The unity of my experiences seems to me to be merely the fact that I, myself, exist as a receiver for these experiences. If I were to think back upon a certain time, that would already be a concept. An atomic unit of experience would have to be something incredibly simple, such as a flash of an unnamed color, or a nameless shape in my perception. If this unit were to be recognized as anything, however, in my experience, then I would have to say that James was correct in assuming that a real experience requires some sort of connection within the experience itself. For instance, my experience of a person growing a beard requires that I know that there is still the same person under that beard, and that the beard is merely an alteration of that person. Over time, this is seen and recognized as a development over time, whereas if I had no such conjunctive relation of experiences, the same person might in fact appear as a completely different one.
James
ReplyDeleteI agree with James' view that classical empiricists do indeed come up short in regards to acknowledging that conjunctive relations are a direct part of our experimental environment. Little bits of certain processes of our lives rely on previous experiences in order to show that the smaller parts to their wholes are legitimate. It is easier to think of the "whole" as a story in a directly related conjunctive experience. For example, when you read a story to a child, each page contains new information that the child perceives and takes into consideration for the story as a whole. Conjunctive relations work the same in that they are connected in ways that are necessary for an end result, but on their own are different in themselves.
James
ReplyDeleteI agree with James in that classical empiricists seem to leaving out conjunctive relations to their theories. It seems silly to think otherwise. I have an idea of a tv set, then I watch a certain tv show, then I watch that same show over and over and that show builds on the last episode. The episodes are seperate things, but each of them has something to do with at least one other tv show. The same reason why I don't watch 24, saw one episode a few weaks back and have no idea what is going on.
I am inclined to agree with Quine's story of a complex web of beliefs confronting empirical reality. This is not to say we cannot separate out these beliefs to some degree, as Colin did, but in a moment or atomic unit we take in so much empirical information at once it is unlikely our minds entertain each belief individually. If each atomic unit was a single distinct belief what determines the succession of them. Do we experience that there is light in the room, then experience their is a cat on the mat, no the are entangled together in a complex web. I would argue that the web is so complex that though we can try to separate the individual belief's out, but cannot succeed. When you try to take what seems to be a part of the web down other parts that are connected t it come with. The belief that these experiences are distinct may just be another belief in the complex web of beliefs.
ReplyDeleteQuine. I agree with Quine because it seems difficult to imagine having a thought that is separate from the web of belief. The experience of "the cat is on the mat" is meaningless without the web of belief that is associated with it.
ReplyDeleteQuine
ReplyDeleteI agree with Quine only because it seems, to me, counterintuitive to not. I don't believe that Quine is arguing against CE as much as taking CE ideals to the next level. Quine's position can also be seen as adding a bit of reason to the CE model, because an individual is able to, through reason, understand an experience and how it relates to other knowledge. "the cat is on the mat" would mean nothing if the individual had no previous conception of what a cat (or a mat) is. On the other hand if the individual has a previous conception of what a cat is, through experience, they can trace that experience to the cat being on the mat. The individual would better comprehend why the cat is on the mat, because he or she understands that a cat is an animal that takes comfort in awkward spots. In essence, experience and ideas link to each other and build off one another.
Quine.
ReplyDeleteI am inclined to agree with Quine’s empiricistic holism, but at the same time, I find it problematic, although perhaps not in the way that Colin might mean. What I mean to say is, although Quine’s view is, I think, more sophisticated and realistic than the somewhat “picturesque” view of “naïve empiricism”, it really makes things a lot messier. We can no longer engage in the straightforward testing of beliefs; when we are met with recalcitrant experiences, there is a whole load of beliefs that are candidates for rejection, and no clear way of finding out which one is the right one to reject. Really, it would have been quite nice if Carnap’s project in the Aufbau could have been completed—the world would be a much simpler place if all of our science and language boiled down to mere sets of simple sense impressions. When Quine’s view triumphs, we are left with a picture that—while perhaps more tenable than that of the Logical Positivists—is not nearly as easy to work with.
I should clarify on my previous post: when I said "it would have been quite nice if Carnap’s project in the Aufbau could have been completed—the world would be a much simpler place if all of our science and language boiled down to mere sets of simple sense impressions" I meant each proposition of science and each word or sentence of language.
ReplyDeleteQuine
ReplyDeleteI agree with Quine on the notion that we cannot reduce our experience to simple sentence-long beliefs. It can be agreed that the nature of reality is one of the more complex subjects of understanding. Likewise, our abilities to perceive and assimilate reality into our minds is equally complex. The mistake that Quine attributes to the CE view is that of making our perception of reality limited to some internal dialogue. To use Colin's example, it is true that when we observe a cat on the mat our minds will simplify our observation to the sentential belief "the cat is on the mat". For us to truly believe reality enough to reach this conclusion, however, we must have already considered every possible property involved in the event of the cat being on the mat. These properties are what Quine labels as the mass of beliefs that work together to make the event a reality. Instead of adhering to our mind's dialoge, these properties are passed through our sensory faculties and mental processing. After receiving this flood of information, our minds reduce what we have acquired to the language of our mind's dialogue, which is the sentence-like structure supported by the CE view.
James
ReplyDeleteAlthough James gives a good argument for the need of a conjunctive relationship, I don’t see Berkeley’s use of God or Hume’s use of custom as an explanation as lacking. I don’t find the need to put an object’s conjunctive relationship outside the subject anymore necessary then putting the object whole and complete outside the subject. We have seen through Berkeley and Locke that an object can exist either outside or inside. Of course I am not taking on a view that holds any philosophy as ‘True’. Taking the example of the person who looks in a mirror each day, seeing a slightly different person but each time the person still recognizes that person as himself/herself, I do not find it necessary to say that a conjunctive relationship must be preset to explain why I am able to recognize myself. Hume explanation that I am taught by custom to recognize the person I see in a mirror as myself is just as sufficient. If one would like to invoke the question of how can justify that its you if it is not the same as before. One can simply respond that your mind has the capacity to rationalize their experience to fit their customary beliefs. For example, every time I look in the mirror I look slightly different and this is always the case, so I recognize myself as always changing, thus the person in the mirror is me in its current state.
Quine. It can be argued that we do experience things piece by piece, because it seems that we receive information in this way, such as: when I see a puzzle piece I only experience that particular piece at that time. Knowing, however, that this is a puzzle piece, and knowing what the picture is, requires much more than simple experiences broken into units. We would have no conception of a puzzle piece if we did not know the relations between the puzzle piece to the entire puzzle, just like we cannot know where the piece goes unless we look at the picture beforehand or else use other similar pieces to figure it out. Without relations between experiences the puzzle piece is useless and meaningless, with no context in which to explain its purpose.
ReplyDeleteJames
ReplyDeleteIn a sense, I agree with Classical Empiricism about their atomic units of experience. We only perceive a single event to occur, putting aside any relationship they may have with another event. We perceive singular events to occur and often, events occur in sequences. So in this specified manner, I do agree that we perceive simple atomic units of experience.
However, I find myself agreeing more with James in his critique of the Classical Empiricists reducing our experiences to these atomic units. I believe our "experiences" consist of two things; the occurrence of atomic units of events and our understanding (I don't want to use "perception" since it often means the direct sensation of an events, rather than also including our extra thoughts concerning the event) of these events and especially our understanding of the sequence in which they occur. Our understanding of these atomic units allows us to make a generalization about events and our experiences; this is how we build an understanding about the world. In general, I believe that our understanding of events is a large part of our "experiences" and is rather necessary. I don't think we can blatantly perceive all events as atomic units, we must take into consideration their relationship to one another as a part of "experience."
Quine.
ReplyDeleteClassical Empiricism does seem to tell us that when scrutinizing an event, it is pertinent that we analyze something bit by bit. But as it was once brought up in class, empiricism cannot truly define itself and thus it is wrong to say that holism cannot be a legitimate discourse. When we experience what Quine would say is a 'cat on a mat', our brain may indeed be processing light, a figure contrasting with the background, the texture of its hair as opposed to that of a nearby wall, the 'on topedness' of a thing which we call a mat relative to that which we call the floor, and so on, but our brains don't break these things down naturally. We might see all of those things and make those individual distinctions in our minds, but the puzzle pieces are instantly put together and our brains tell us that what we are seeing is a cat on a mat. I believe this is how cognition works and so Quine would be correct in saying we experience webs of things rather than each atomic particle.