Last week's blog discussion concerned the possibility of relativism in Hume's moral philosophy. Some of the questions posed included: Do you think that Hume's sentimentalist account of morality can avoid moral relativism? Or is Hume's idea that moral knowledge relies on the sentiments an invitation to relativism that he cannot get shut again?
As is clear from the comments to last week's posts, there is no obvious answer to this question. People offered intelligent arguments for both positions.
Some of you posed some very clear problems if Hume is to escape moral relativism. For instance, Ronald wrote that, "If Hume believes that certain passions formed through our impressions are the motivating factors behind our moral thoughts, then it should follow that individuals with different impressions or thoughts can have different passions motivating their moral thoughts." And Robin similarly noted that, "In order to avoid this moral relativism, it seems that Hume would have to admit that at least some passions are universal."
One clue to how Hume thinks we can escape these problems is noted in his aesthetic writings (for instance "Of the Standard of Taste" which we are reading for Thursday). In this essay Hume is also talking about our non-rational selves and is defending the idea that aesthetic judgment can be universalized in a way that would enable him to avoid moral relativism (to put the point as a response to Robin's very articulate objection). Hume argues that our facilities for aesthetic judgment admit of improvement and education. He specifically refers to three forms of practice in aesthetic judgment that will help us improve our "delicacy" of taste: 1) comparison of different aesthetic objects, 2) freeing ourselves from aesthetic prejudices, 3) exercising and learning "good sense" in aesthetics (though it is not really clear what this last one is).
Hume's aesthetics suggests a point about his ethical writings that is emphasized in the second Enquiry, namely that our moral selves are educable. Hume's claim has at least some initial plausibility in that he offers a character-centered account of morality (rather than an act-and-duty-centered account of morality a la Kant). Insofar as our moral selves are a bundle of moral sentmients comprising a moral character equipped with a number of virtuous or vicious habits, then we can presumably improve our sentiments, characters, and habits over time.
This brings me to this week's question. Hume says that we can educate ourselves in the way of morals by attending to and improving the sentiments that form our moral character. Is the moral education of our sentiments that Hume asserts sufficient to defeat the charge of moral relativism raised against Hume last week? Answer "Yes" or "No." If you answer "yes", then give a short argument as to how you think Hume can defeat moral relativism with a claim about the moral education of our sentiments, sympathies, habits, and characters. If you answer "no", then give a short argument as to why a Humean story about the moral education of our sentiments (etc.) is not sufficient to rule out relativism.
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No. That our moral sense is educable implies one of two things, to me. If Hume's understanding of 'educable' is restricted to refinement ("improve[ing] our "delicacy" of taste") then his statement has no moral substance. The refined ability to distinguish the moral intricacies of some action/character is no grounds for judging its 'goodness' or 'badness'. Identification, in other words, is not judgment.
ReplyDeleteIf, instead, Hume hopes to define educability in terms of improvement, then we are left with nothing more than we began with. Improvement, to be anything but 'refinement', must have some standard of measurement off of which it is based. (How can we judge if we are getting better, if we have no sense of what it is to be better?) But Hume fails to define any way to judge our improvement. This leaves us in basically the same position as before, with no means of establishing value outside of our own sentiment. Unless Hume establishes some rigid standard off of which we can base our moral sense he cannot escape the charge of relativism.
Second.
ReplyDeletealso NO, I guess it isn't enough to defeat moral relativism. What if your sentiments tell you that slapping people in the face when you see them makes you happy? If you improved this sentiment, the only thing that would get better would be your slapping technique. Now that can't be good can it? What a better question is why moral relativism has to be defeated in the first place. I do not understand why it is such a problem, I believe in different strokes for different folks. There cannot be an absolute moral system because there is no such thing as the absolute person that can be applied to everyone (a la Berkeley and the abstract general). Since morality mostly deals with people, and these people are always different, the only thing we can regulate in these positions, the only constant (sort of), is ourselves. That is why Hume goes for the betterment of ourselves. If everyone does that, then I guess everyone would be pretty chill. Too bad they aren't. Damn happy slappers.
Definitely not. Hume's notion that we can improve ourselves implies some sort of uniformity or way it ought to be as far as the sentiments go. If we are to take Hume's position further it would lead us to believe that we are all to eventually, through education and culture, arrive at some agreement of what is ultimately good and bad. Hume would even have to say that there are no opinions, because even the most insignificant matters of opinion could eventually become part of a moral question to which there would need be a universally correct answer. However, it is doubtful that Hume would want to concede that, otherwise he would be giving more of a ten commandments type account of morality which he takes pains to stay away from. Since the only way to defeat moral relativism is by making Hume's account into something that it is not, it seems that his story doesn't cut it.
ReplyDeleteI'm going to have to agree with everyone else so far. No, Hume's idea that moral sensibility can be refined implies that there is some agreed upon sense of morality. He has not made it clear that this exists, or what this is if it does exist.
ReplyDeleteI think that he might say that the 'sympathy' we feel from other people establishes a sort of consensus; or that the standard whould be a utilitarian 'whatever is good for society' type view. The first of these responses does not work because it implies that the person who I am sympathizing with has the proper understanding of morality, and there is no reason to believe he/she does. The second response doesn't work for the same reason, it implies that society has the proper sense of 'good' in mind. One can imagine Huckelberry Finn turning over Mr. Jim the runaway slave on the basis that, 'it's what's best for society.'
Hume doesn't seem to account for the proper what constitutes the proper moral action when society and sympathy collide. It's all well in fine to acknowledge that whatever the choice it's the character and not that one action which defines a man, but I think Mr. Jim would take issue with that idea.
No. The moral education of our sentiments is not sufficient to defeat moral relativism. Exercising “good sense” is really an arbitrary form of exercise. This is because one can ascribe the term “good” to whatever they enjoy, i.e. the torturing of innocent children. Though common consensus of such atrocious torture would say that it is a negative thing, there exist a few who get enjoyment out of such an act. For these few, they could argue that they are simply excising “good sense” in regards of the aesthetics of their judgment on such an action, basically because they feel and deem it fair.
ReplyDeleteSo where Hume maintains that moral growth or education is universal, there is still the possibility for such education to grow both ways. The man who tortures children will continue to grow morally in a negative and grotesque way and his actions will continue to worsen. Likewise, someone growing in a positive way will continue their education as well and uphold the common virtuous demeanor. So moral education may be universal, but because growth is possibly both ways, ethical relativism cannot be escaped by this argument.
No. Hume's notion that moral sensibility can be improved or refined asserts that there is some uniform law of morality. The problem with this of course is that there is no uniform law of morality, at least not one that Hume mentions.
ReplyDeleteEveryone Hume thinks, has a chance to grow morally, however this could mean two completely different things to two completely different groups of people. Although it is true that two groups of people could be morally happy with their own actions, when compared and contrasted by the other group their actions could seem terrible. In this case, both groups would be acting morally to themselves, but not to the other group. So it is possible for people to continuously grow morally, but with their own morals, not according to a universal law of morality.
No, agreeing with everyone else. :) Hume banks on human beings having an educable character as a basis for morality existing through the sentiments. What one "ought to be like" is not sufficient to defeat moral relativism. Moral knowledge, according to Hume, does not seem to be absolute, although I'm sure he would care to differ. In order for sympathy to function properly, individuals would need to feel the "proper" type of feeling to achieve a universal sense of morality. The universal basis for sentiment is lacking, especially when looking across cultures. Who is to say that there is a particular, universal way that one "ought to conform to"? And, with the many different ideas about morality and what is moral, whose sentiments ought we trust? It still appears that Hume does not avoid relativism as he does not have universality on his side.
ReplyDeleteLooks like I'm the lone yes so far. It is possible for Hume to rule out moral relativism by pointing out that certain evils do not have to exist and that they are pursued in all forms of morality, namely unnecessary suffering.
ReplyDeleteIf all ethical theories are striving for this there can be a universal morality that each are striving towards. I don't have the answer to what this is but I'm sure with careful thought one can find evidence to substantiate this view.
No, Hume does not provide a actual basis for where the education of our sentiments comes from, and if a priori, why are they ordered in such a way? if by experience (a posteriori), then why are we not confused in our rationalizations; why do we not associate that all pain is pleasure and vice versa? Just because a slate is blank and is able to receive impressions does not mean that it will suddenly start acting nicely to you. There are conditions which must be ordered by something which can be proven to be a cause in itself.
ReplyDeleteI think that Hume probably can never escape the dreaded clutches of moral relativism. even with the education of the passions. however i do want to ask, what is so bad about moral relativism? even thought the basic argument for relativism is self referentially incoherent, it still appears that this mode of morality, whereby everyone tolerates everyone elses morality is in the end the best system for making the world work well together. I am very sure that even if Hume could find a way to standardize the education of the character, variation would still exist with in the realm of morality. I doubt that there will ever be one cohesive moral code which will work for every person in the world. If you have to pick a system that works relativism is not a bad pick, much better than say, Kant's moral imperative or any thing else. So no i do not think Hume can escape being a relativist, however in relation to living the life we have to live relativism is not a bad choice.
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ReplyDeleteI guess I'm the second yes. I may be interpreting Hume wrong, but I'm hoping not. ... It seems to me everyone disagrees that moral education of the sentiments could lead to a standardization of these sentiments, and this, therefore, would lead to relativism. But I disagree. People could be born or conditioned to have different sentiments on different occasions, but through proper education of these sentiments, they could be trained to have the same sentiments. It seems to me all properly morally educated people, according to Hume, would share the same correct sentiments. Their sentiments would be the right sentiments as opposed to those who are uneducated and have different incorrect sentiments. There is right in wrong with this addition of education to Hume's moral theory.
ReplyDeleteYes.
ReplyDeleteI think society does play a big role in developing what is moral. For instance; now days it is just about universally accepted (at least in our country) that slavery is inherently wrong, however, this belief has not always been universally held. That is not to say that sense of morality is always an educated sense. I believe people can be born with a sense of right on wrong, but I do believe that the sense is guided by societal norms.
No, moral relativism cannot be solved by Hume's explanation of moral education. Even if it is possible that we can refine our morality, there is no single ideal to work towards. Sentiment activates our moral decision making based on the benevolence and utility attached to the issue by society. Issues of justice depend on the social structures and values that make common notions of pain and pleasure, which in turn create sympathies to guide moral action. Society is not structured uniformly, thus variation and growth in moral knowledge becomes a product of different definitions of morals relative to each social group.
ReplyDeleteI would have to say yes. I am sticking to my guns with regards to my response to the post last week. We are to participate in active philosophy, or for those who do not partake in philosophy, at least an active life. If we have passions that are contrary to the majority of society, we should be able to learn that through interacting with society. Trial and error are key here. What may seem right may actually turn out wrong. We learn from that. Yes, there may be those people out there who still feel that they are right, even in light of society constantly disapproving of their actions. These people, i think, are not striving for what Hume has in mind, and that is social utility. If we are all striving for social utility, we should allow our characters to be educated by society so that we can achieve that goal.
ReplyDeleteAfter getting into my essay a little bit I'm going to have to switch my answer to yes.
ReplyDeleteI think that Hume's account of education allows for an escape from moral relativism for precisely the same reason that Becca Gardner brought up.
For Hume, what someone thinks is moral, or even feels is moral, may be relative to his particular education or a distorted perspective in his childhood; however, this would not be considered a 'moral' outlook, it would be a lack of morality. I think the key problem we're confronted with when we view his philosophy as relativistic is the failure to realize that in saying that morality rests in virtues which have utility, Hume is saying that in order for something to be moral it must have utility.
Hume's moral education consists of learning empathize with others, so if a person is failing to do that then he is not being moral.
I think there is some support for a relativist argument on the grounds that different cultures may have different ideas of morality, but this is far from the 'relative morality' which I originally read Hume as advocating for. Furthermore, I think Hume would say that when these two cultures interacted their morality would have to be redefined according to the 'greatest amount of pleasure' and so would cease to be relative.
No. Even admitting that morality can be molded and ubiquitized by education, to avoid relativism requires admitting to a universal standard. If one is to be educated about morality, there must be a set of standard facts that one is to learn. If these standard facts are not universal, then they are arbitrary standard generated by whatever culture this education is happening in, and are therefore relative. So to avoid relativism, even with education, Hume must admit to a universal standard. If he's trying to avoid that, he's trapped in a corner.
ReplyDeleteWhat is the universal standard? There are arguments going both ways for any so called universal standard we might come up with. Neither the categorical imperative nor utilitarianism really settle any issue of morality. Does this mean that every form of ethics is relativism?
ReplyDeleteNo. The moral education of our sentiments is not sufficient to absolve the charge of moral relativism. Insofar as passions are formed qua the impressions which allow for the possibility of moral thoughts, it does not necessarily follow that moral education will necessitate strict adherence to said education. Nor does it necessarily follow that when our moral selves are educable, that each self will take away the same education. Even if the education is to take place at such a fundamental level that what is being educated is the very basis by which the moral self comports it self towards the world; the capacity for each moral self to absorb the same teaching (given all teachings were following some "universal moral code") is disparate.
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ReplyDeleteyes and no. i believe that morals are definitely influenced by societal norms, which certainly change over time and are vastly different in various cultures. this would suggest that if large groups of people are able to change their moral code, individuals must be able to. however, the moral changes an individual may experience throughout his/her life seem so much more difficult to comprehend. it seems to me that people are "innately" born with certain moral concepts and intuit what "feels right and wrong". i'm not sure if this changes so much in individuals as it does on a wider scale as a result of reactions to larger movements comprised of people directly reacting as opposed to asserting change.
ReplyDeleteNo, I do not think that the moral education of our sentiments that Hume asserts is sufficient to defeat the charge of moral relativism...
ReplyDeleteWhereas, according to Hume, we are able to refine our tastes through education, refining our morals seems to be a much more difficult task. As Hume himself states, "There needs but a certain turn of thought or imagination to make us enter into all the opinions...and relish the sentiments or conclusions derived from them. But a very violent effort is requisiste to change our judgment of manners, and excite sentiments of approbation or blame, love or hatred, different from those to which the mind from long custom has been familiarized."
Also, even if we could easily accomplish moral education, it seems to me that, by Hume's account, it would be very difficult if not impossible to find an ideal critic, and this would be problematic.
No, Hume can't escape moral relativism, but that's really not a bad thing. Morals differ from place to place because people are different. There is no universal standard. There is no ideal critic. All there is is a bunch of different people with different tastes and different morals
ReplyDeleteI think that Hume is aware of the Moral Relativism problem and what he proposes in Of the Standard of Taste is that there are certain experiences, which are universal in their nature, that transcend that fact that taste is generally subjective (Hume 231). The ideal judge, in Hume’s mind, will be someone void of prejudgments, i.e. the impartial spectator. However, it is necessary that this person be someone who understands morality. Hume’s example of the works of Homer being hailed throughout history made me think of the Ars Poetica by Horace and that what Hume is arguing for is a type of Ars Ethica . The value of Homer’s works comes from custom and tradition; hence it is a question of education. So within Hume’s framework this holds; however, I don’t know if it answers the question. What I find interesting is that Hume bases his entire moral system on a phantasmatic other that is going to be the standard on which a moral agent will base their actions. I have Lacan’s “mirror stage.” I am thinking that where the ego’s formation of itself, based on the imago, leads to a number of psychoses in the subject; so will the formation of a moral self lead to similar complications.
ReplyDeleteNo, I do not think that Hume’s idea of moral education of our sentiments defeat the charge of moral relativism.
ReplyDeleteThis idea of moral education still does not entail any universality. One group of people may have all have a similar idea, learned through experience and passions, that kicking the least effective hunter out of their clan is moral. They might educate their group members with very good reasons of why it is morally important to have only the most effective hunters. One form of moral education might be finding out ways to figure out if someone is a bad hunter while he is an infant, that way their group can be rid of him sooner rather than later. However there are many people who would think that abandoning an infant because he might not turn out to be a good hunter is morally wrong. The education and refinement of morals by a social structure could end in many ways. Ultimately Hume still does not offer a universal set of morals which this education should be striving towards. Therefore the moral refinement and education could actually be leading a civilization more astray from what most people would like to consider moral.
I think that Hume believes in a universal ideal of morality. There is so much talk about passions and how one is naturally disposed to feel sympathy for others that I think THIS is Hume's idea of universal morality. From this idea that "everyone feels a certain way" stems what Hume would argue is the correct moral code. This may seem almost contradictory to his idea of empiricism (such that if it is not explicitly experienced, then it should only be considered an abstraction and not a quality of reality), but to Hume, feeling sympathy is a direct experience of morality. If we use this sympathy as our basis fr a moral coed, we can then use reason to describe certain properties to morals and then educate others in these terms.
ReplyDeleteNo, I do not think that Hume's moral education of our sentiments is a sufficient argument for refuting the charge of moral relativism. I feel like this would imply that there is some moral sentiment which is superior to all others, that we must strive for, and that is the goal of moral education. I feel like this conception would be directly contrary to what Hume claims on page 123 of An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding: "We must not, however, expect that this uniformity of human actions should be carried to such a length as that all men, in the same circumstances, will always act precisely in the same manner, without making any allowance for the diversity of characters, prejudices, and opinions."
ReplyDeleteYes. The fact that a relatively small amount of the art that has been produced has "stood the test of time" suggests that people regardless of time period and culture agree on what is aesthetically "good." Therefore, it seems to educate people's aesthetic delicacies would bring their tastes into alignment with what has been considered "great art" for generations.
ReplyDeleteIt seems that the idea of the education of delicacy is not as specific as it sounds. I suspect it has to do with raising awareness in general, increasing people's capacity to take in sensory information and comprehend and appreciate it. To improve your aesthetic delicacy would be to go from "What's so special about Beethoven?" to "Oh, THAT's what's so special about Beethoven.
I would agree with the majority that Hume's account of our morals being educable is not a sufficient reason to overcome moral relativism. In claiming that aesthetic judgment can be universalized to avoid moral relativism, Hume is saying that moral growth and education is what refines our tastes. But what dictates how our morals grow or on what basis it is educated? Simply, by what means are our "delicate" tastes refined? Hume is saying that universally, our tastes are refined. However, I think Hume's error is that he cannot assign a certain trait or moral (by which our tastes are refined) as universal. Instead, what I find occurs is that each society or certain type of "group" develop their own morals to apply as their "refining" tool.
ReplyDeleteEven if we were to constantly assert what "one ought to be", where is the necessity that thought will precisely mirror through everyone's mind. Centuries ago, the birth of a son of a king or emperor was far more favored than the birth of a daughter; in China, girls were often even given away or simply thrown away. Obviously this type of preference for children varied throughout the world. And even if it didn't, we could properly say that the world we live in today does not have such a biased favoring of sons. Thus, through culture or through time, what has been considered "right" changes; so could there be an entirely universal moral to apply as refinement? Hume would have to specify and defend.
In theory yes, in practice no. Our moral sentiments can be corrupted by certain experiences (as Hume admits to.) Depending on what kinds of experiences different cultures are frequently exposed to, sentiments will vary. It is true that cultivating our sympathies would create more understanding between groups of people. In theory this ability to sympathize should lead to the creation of a global morality. However, this is impractical with our world as it is because we have such drastically different experiences culture to culture (basically, our sentiments are too corrupted.) There is no way to practically educate all people alive today and expect some kind of universal consensus. Furthering our tolerance and understanding to achieve a more peaceful atmosphere is a more reasonable goal. Achieving universal agreement is not. Our different experiences of things such as violence, oppression, greed, religion, and survival are too greatly different and have corrupted people too much to achieve complete solidarity.
ReplyDeleteBrandi Gratis
No. You can't teach moral sentiment to people. First it is impossible to ever teach everyone to agree upon a certain sentiment to defeat the charge of moral relativism. Sentiment cannot be taught, for how would anyone really know that what one feels is the same as what another person feels? And who would be the one to say there is a certain moral sentiment that all people should agree on. I just don't think Hume can dig himself out of this one..
ReplyDeleteNo. I agree with Alec in that identifying is not a judgement and that improvement can only be noted if you can judge what it means to improve. Without an example or experience of improvement, you won't know if you're getting closer to it. For that matter, you won't even know if you're even educating or improving the 'right' thing. We all wind up where we started and start slipping towards moral relativism all over again. Furthermore, if refining our taste means comparing experiences with others and developing a consensus on what it means to be good or refined, then how can we take into account our individual sentiments? Perhaps I hate the color pink and the rest of the room loves pink and thus considers a canvas colored only pink to be excellent. I would disagree! Am I therefore uneducated? I think not.
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